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September 11 9:50-9:55
''This is a new article. As such is has been set to unassessed. Category:Content (9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Manager Tries Unsuccessfully to Initiate Lockout of Flight 93 Rich Miles, the manager of United Airlines’ System Operations Control center outside Chicago, tries to initiate the “lockout” procedure for Flight 93, which would acknowledge an emergency on the flight and safeguard information about it, but he is unable to do so. At some time between 9:45 a.m. and 9:50 a.m., the United Airlines maintenance facility in San Francisco contacted Miles about a call it had just received from an attendant on Flight 93, reporting that her plane had been hijacked (see 9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001). In response, Miles attempts to initiate a lockout of Flight 93. Lockout is a standard procedure for airlines in safety and security incidents, which isolates information about a flight so the case can be managed by the airline’s top leadership, and protects the identities of the passengers and crew. But Miles is unable activate this procedure. According to the 9/11 Commission, this is because United Airlines has already conducted a lockout of Flight 175 (see (9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and its computer system is not presently set up to deal simultaneously with two such procedures. STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 12-13 AND 43 (9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Speaker of the House Hastert Evacuated to Secure Location outside Washington Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, who is third in line for the presidency, is evacuated from the US Capitol building and flown to a secret underground bunker in Virginia, where he remains until late in the afternoon. NEWS, 9/11/2001; ABC NEWS, 9/15/2002 Around 9:48, the Capitol building had begun evacuating (see 9:48 a.m. September 11, 2001). At that time, Hastert was on the House floor. Two members of his security detail now enter the chamber and tell him, “We’re going to evacuate the Capitol, and you’re going to a secure location.” They take him out of the building and drive him hurriedly to Andrews Air Force Base, ten miles southeast of Washington. After he arrives there, Hastert is finally able to communicate with Vice President Dick Cheney, who is at the White House. (Hastert had been trying to contact Cheney earlier on, but without success (see (9:04 a.m.-9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001.) Cheney tells Hastert: “There’s a real danger. I want you to go to a secure location.” 2004, PP. 8-9 Hastert gets on a helicopter and is flown to the secret underground bunker at Mount Weather in Bluemont, Virginia, 48 miles outside Washington—about 20 minutes journey by air. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 11/2001; ABC NEWS, 9/15/2002; BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 81 In the following hours, other top members of the House and Senate leaderships will join him there (see (Between Late Morning and Early Afternoon) September 11, 2001). NEWS, 9/11/2001; HASTERT, 2004, PP. 10 Hastert remains at the secure facility for several hours, and will return to Washington late in the afternoon (see (Between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). HERALD (ARLINGTON HEIGHTS), 9/11/2002. Hastert’s evacuation to Mount Weather is the result of “Continuity of Government” (COG) orders, which provide for evacuating the third and fourth in the line of presidential succession during a national emergency, in order to protect the nation’s constitutional leadership. POST, 1/27/2002 Richard Clarke activated the COG plan shortly before 10:00 a.m. this morning (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). 2004, PP. 8 (9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Delta Air Lines Reports Four Missing Planes Leo Mullin. Publicity photo Leo Mullin, the CEO of Delta Air Lines, calls FAA Administrator Jane Garvey at FAA headquarters in Washington, DC, and reports that four Delta aircraft are missing. Mullin, who is at his company’s headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, tells Garvey: “We can’t find four of our planes. Four of our transponders are off.” TODAY, 8/13/2002; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 186 The identities of these aircraft are unstated. Whether they include Delta Flight 1989, which FAA air traffic controllers have mistakenly reported as being a possible hijacking (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001 and 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001), is unclear. At 9:27 a.m., the FAA’s Boston Center reported that this plane was missing (see 9:27 a.m. September 11, 2001). AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, 9/11/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003 But, according to the 9/11 Commission, Delta 1989 “never turned off its transponder.” COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 28 USA Today will report that, after “early reports that a bomb, then hijackers, might be aboard, Delta CEO Leo Mullin, 58, had nervously tracked 1989 from the company’s headquarters in Atlanta. Every five minutes, a new report came in. None seemed clear.” TODAY, 8/13/2002 Entity Tags: Leo Mullin, Jane Garvey, Delta Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events 9:50 a.m. September 11, 2001: Passenger Sandy Bradshaw Tells of Preparations to Fight Three Men with Knives Sandra Bradshaw. Family photo Sandy Bradshaw calls her husband from Flight 93. She says, “Have you heard what’s going on? My flight has been hijacked. My flight has been hijacked with three guys with knives.” GLOBE, 11/23/2001 She tells him that some passengers are in the rear galley filling pitchers with hot water to use against the hijackers. POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001 Entity Tags: Sandy Bradshaw Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls (Between 9:50 a.m. and 10:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Myers Wants Clarification of Rules of Engagement for Fighter Pilots; Clarke Wants This Issued Promptly Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers wants clear rules of engagement for military fighter pilots, according to counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke. In his book Against All Enemies, Clarke will describe hearing that the president has authorized the military to shoot down hostile aircraft some time between about 9:45 and 9:56 (see (Between 9:45 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001). From the White House Situation Room, where he is located, he then gets the attention of those on the video conference screen for the Pentagon, and informs them of this decision. Myers asks, “Okay, shoot down aircraft, but what are the ROE of engagement?” As Clarke will comment, “It was one thing to say it’s okay to shoot down a hijacked aircraft threatening to kill people on the ground, but we needed to give pilots more specific guidelines than that.” Clarke asks his colleague Franklin Miller and Marine Colonel Tom Greenwood—a member of Miller’s staff—to ensure that the Defense Department has “an answer to that question quickly.” He tells them, “I don’t want them delaying while they lawyer that to death.” Clarke recalls that he is then informed: “CNN says car bomb at the State Department. Fire on the Mall near the Capitol.” 2004, PP. 8-9 It is therefore unclear exactly what time he is describing, as CNN first makes the incorrect report of the State Department car bomb at 10:33, but it reports the fire on the Mall at 9:45. 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/11/2001; BROADCASTING AND CABLE, 8/26/2002 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld will tell the 9/11 Commission that he works on fashioning the rules of engagement for fighter pilots, in collaboration with Myers, after he enters the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMCC) at around 10:30 (see (10:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001). COMMISSION, 3/23/2004 Yet he does not complete and issue these rules until 1:00 p.m. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 465; COCKBURN, 2007, PP. 7; MYERS, 2009, PP. 157-158 Entity Tags: Richard A. Clarke, Richard B. Myers, Franklin Miller, Tom Greenwood Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke (9:50 a.m. and After) September 11, 2001: Cleveland Airport and City Buildings Evacuated due to Possibly Hijacked Aircraft Coming in to Land Michael White. Publicity photo Cleveland Hopkins Airport and numerous buildings in the city of Cleveland are evacuated, following the decision to land Delta Air Lines Flight 1989—which is wrongly thought to be hijacked and with a bomb on board—at the Cleveland airport. PRESS, 9/11/2001; WKYC, 9/11/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 191-192 Airport Concerned about Delta 1989 - Delta Air Lines was concerned about Flight 1989, and instructed it to land as soon as possible in Cleveland (see (9:42 a.m.) September 11, 2001). 2008, PP. 167; USA TODAY, 9/11/2008 FAA and military personnel have mistakenly suspected that this aircraft has been hijacked (see (9:28 a.m.-9:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001, 9:39 a.m. September 11, 2001, and (Shortly After 9:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and their concerns have reached personnel at Cleveland Airport. Fred Szabo, the airport commissioner, will later recall: “There was an indication that this might be a terrorist plane. We didn’t know if there were bombs on board, or if it was a hijacked plane.” COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 27-28; WKYC, 9/11/2006; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 167-168 Airport Evacuated as Plane Approaches - As Delta 1989 heads in to land, air traffic controllers instruct it to follow a long path that initially takes it far past the airport. According to author Lynn Spencer, the “controllers are giving themselves time to evacuate the airport since 1989 has been confirmed hijacked and since they believe it contains a bomb intended to detonate when the aircraft crashes into the terminal.” Even FAA personnel at the airport evacuate their building and make their way to a huge NASA hangar next door. 2008, PP. 191-192 After Delta 1989 lands, police block off all entrances to the airport terminal, and bomb-sniffing dogs are brought to baggage pickup areas. PRESS, 9/11/2001 City Buildings Evacuated - Furthermore, for the first time in his administration, Cleveland Mayor Michael White orders the evacuation of all federal and city buildings. 9/20/2001 Schools are closed and a parking ban is issued downtown. 9/12/2001 White also asks owners of large commercial high-rises to evacuate. PRESS, 9/11/2001 These evacuation efforts presumably benefit from the fact that Cleveland is one of six major Ohio cities that has, for a number of years, been part of a federal program to help defend against domestic terrorism. 9/20/2001 NASA Facility Evacuated - Even the 3,500 employees at the NASA Glenn Research Center, which is located adjacent to the Cleveland airport, are ordered to evacuate their facility. Directors there had in fact met and decided to evacuate the center after seeing the television coverage of the second attack on the World Trade Center. It takes about an hour and a half to get everyone out of the building. FREE TIMES, 9/6/2006 Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Fred Szabo, Cleveland Hopkins International Airport, Michael R. White Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events (Between 9:50 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS Commander Orders Jets Launched from All Air National Guard Units in Northeast US In the battle cab at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS), Colonel Robert Marr instructs his troops to contact every Air National Guard unit in the Northeast US and tell them to get their fighter jets airborne. 2008, PP. 180 NEADS has already launched the four fighters in the Northeast US that are kept on alert, ready to take off at a moment’s notice: Two F-15s were scrambled from Otis Air National Guard Base at 8:46 (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001) and two F-16s were scrambled from Langley Air Force Base at 9:24 (see 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 17, 20, 27 NEADS Calls Air National Guard Units - Marr now realizes these four jets are not enough, and tells his troops: “The nation is under attack. Get ‘em in the air!” Officers in the NEADS battle cab and on its operations floor begin calling Air National Guard units, one after another. The NEADS officers are surprised to find that wing commanders have been anticipating their call for help, and have already started arming fighter jets. According to author Lynn Spencer: “Although wing commanders do not necessarily have the authority to arm their planes with live missiles, nor Marr the authority to call them into action, these are not ordinary times. Marr can’t help but think that the incredible response is due to the fact that the Guard units are Title 32, or state-owned. They report to the governors of their respective states, and the wing commanders have every confidence that their governors will support them.” COMMISSION, 10/30/2003 ; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 180 Time of Order Unclear - Exactly when Marr instructs his officers to contact the Air National Guard units is unclear. It appears to be at around 9:50 a.m., or some time shortly after. At the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters in Florida, CONR commander Major General Larry Arnold began contacting all three CONR sectors (which includes NEADS) at around 9:45 a.m., after learning the Pentagon had been hit and realizing the attacks were no longer isolated to New York. His instruction to the sectors was, “Generate, generate, generate!” meaning, “Get as many fighters as you can into the sky now!” 2008, PP. 177-178 General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD, directed “all air sovereignty aircraft to battle stations, fully armed,” at 9:49 a.m. (see 9:49 a.m. September 11, 2001). COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 38 But “battle stations” means only that pilots get into their aircraft with the engines turned off, so they are ready to launch if a scramble order follows. 2003, PP. 55; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 27 The Toledo Blade will report, “By 10:01 a.m., NEADS began calling several bases across the country for help.” BLADE, 12/9/2001 According to the Newhouse News Service, though, Marr apparently gave his order significantly earlier. It will report that, when the South Tower was hit at 9:03, NEADS personnel “looked to Col. Robert Marr, who rallied the operation: Get to the phones. Call every Air National Guard unit in the land. Prepare to put jets in the air. The nation is under attack” (see (After 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001). NEWS SERVICE, 1/25/2002 Air National Guard jets will reportedly take off from Toledo Express Airport in Ohio at 10:17 a.m., in response to NEADS’s call for help, and, according to Spencer, NEADS instructs Otis Air Base to launch all its available aircraft at around 10:20 a.m. (see (10:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). BLADE, 12/9/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 244-245 Entity Tags: Robert Marr, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Air National Guard Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93 (9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Supervisor Tells DC Air National Guard Pilots on Training to Hurry Back to Base Three F-16 fighter jets that are on their way back from a training mission over North Carolina finally make contact with their supervisor of flying (SOF) and are instructed to return to Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland as quickly as possible. 2003, PP. 79; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 216-217 The jets belong to the 121st Fighter Squadron, part of the 113th Wing of the DC Air National Guard, which is based at Andrews AFB, 10 miles from Washington, DC. OF COLUMBIA AIR NATIONAL GUARD, 7/24/2001; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 10/21/2001; GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 11/15/2001; AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002 They left Andrews at 8:36 for a routine training mission on a range about 200 miles away from there, in North Carolina (see 8:36 a.m. September 11, 2001). 2003, PP. 79; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 3/8/2004 Supervisor Wants Jets Back Immediately - Major Daniel Caine, who is the SOF with their unit, had been concerned about the three F-16s since the time of the second crash in New York. He’d felt certain that airspace restrictions would be implemented around Washington, and realized he needed to get the jets back to base right away before the Washington airspace was closed. Because the jets were outside his radio range, he called a refueling plane they were scheduled to meet, and asked its pilot to tell them to return to Andrews. 2008, PP. 122-124 Pilots Told to Return as Fast as Possible - Having met with the refueling plane (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), the lead pilot of the F-16s, Major Billy Hutchison, is now about half way back from the training mission and finally in radio range of Andrews, so he calls the SOF there. 2003, PP. 79; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 216-217 By this time, Caine has left his post, as he intends to take off in a jet himself (see (Shortly After 9:39 a.m.) September 11, 2001), and Lieutenant Colonel Phil Thompson has replaced him as SOF. 2008, PP. 184 Thompson says to Hutchison: “We need you here now! You need to return to base ‘buster’!” The code word “buster” means Hutchison is to push his thrust lever into afterburner and fly as fast as his plane will go. 2008, PP. 217 Thompson does not tell Hutchison anything about the terrorist attacks. Hutchison’s only awareness of the morning’s crisis is what little he’d been told by the pilot of the refueling plane. COMMISSION, 2/27/2004 But he has never heard the code word “buster” used before, and realizes something very bad is going on. 2008, PP. 217 Hutchison Sees Burning Pentagon - Hutchison will later recall: “So we light afterburners and we are coming back at Mach as quick as we can get back.… As I get back, I cross the Potomac River on the south end of Maryland and Virginia, and I see a big column of smoke. It was so clear and there was no haze in the air.” He again talks over the radio with Thompson. Hutchison says: “It looks like there’s been an explosion near Reagan National Airport. What’s going on?’” Thompson replies: “We know. Just keep coming.” 2003, PP. 79 The first of the three F-16s returning from the training mission will land back at Andrews AFB at 10:14 a.m. (see 10:14 a.m. September 11, 2001). The other two land at 10:36 a.m., but Hutchison will be instructed to take off again immediately (see (10:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001). WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9/9/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 2/17/2004 Entity Tags: 121st Fighter Squadron, District of Columbia Air National Guard, Billy Hutchison, Phil Thompson Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events (9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines CEO Carty Questions Transportation Secretary Mineta about Plane that Hit Pentagon Don Carty, the CEO of American Airlines, asks Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta to confirm which airplane has hit the Pentagon, but is frustrated when Mineta cannot provide a definite answer. Carty, who is at the American Airlines System Operations Control (SOC) center in Texas, and Mineta, who is in the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) below the White House, are participating in a phone conference call (see (Between 9:22 a.m. and 9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Carty asks Mineta what type of plane hit the Pentagon, to see if it belongs to American Airlines. Receiving no firm answer, he exclaims: “For God’s sake, it’s in the Pentagon. Can’t somebody go look at it and see whose plane it is?” Mineta replies: “They have. You can’t tell.” STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 186 American Airlines will not learn until later on that the plane that hit the Pentagon was its Flight 77. COMMISSION, 1/27/2004 At around 11:18 a.m., it will issue a statement in which it mentions Flight 77 (see (11:18 a.m.) September 11, 2001), but this statement will only say that Flight 77 is one of two planes the airline has “lost” in “tragic incidents this morning.” PRESS, 9/11/2001; CNN, 9/12/2001 Entity Tags: Norman Mineta, Don Carty, American Airlines Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events (9:50 a.m.-10:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Giuliani Goes to Temporary Command Post but Soon Evacuates It After spending about 40 minutes at the disaster scene, on the World Trade Center site, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani relocates to a small office building at 75 Barclay Street, about two blocks from the WTC, hoping to establish a command post there. His usual command center, in WTC 7, was evacuated at around 9:30 a.m. (see (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). With him are several colleagues, including Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik and Office of Emergency Management Director Richard Sheirer. 2001, PP. 334; GIULIANI, 2002, PP. 10; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/18/2004 ; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/19/2004; BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 10 While at Barclay Street, Giuliani is able to get in touch with the White House, and speaks to Chris Henick, the deputy political director to President Bush (see 9:58 a.m. September 11, 2001). Immediately afterwards, he receives a phone call from Vice President Cheney, though this is cut off before either one is able to speak. Giuliani also claims he is given advance warning of the South Tower’s collapse while at this command post (see (Before 9:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001). After the South Tower collapses outside, Giuliani and his colleagues all decide to evacuate, going through the basement into a neighboring building, 100 Church Street. They will then leave this and head north, being joined by cameras and press. AND MATHIAS, 2002, PP. 112; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/19/2004; BARRETT AND COLLINS, 2006, PP. 348 Entity Tags: Rudolph (“Rudy”) Giuliani, Bernard Kerik, Richard Sheirer Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events (9:50 a.m.-10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Reports of Unresponsive Aircraft Prompt Evacuation of CIA Headquarters By 9:50 a.m., CIA Director George Tenet is in his office on the seventh floor of the agency’s Langley headquarters. He later describes: “Everyone was wondering, what next? Reports came in of several airplanes that were not responding to communications from the ground and perhaps heading toward Washington. Several Center officers reminded us that al-Qaeda members had once discussed flying an airplane into CIA headquarters, the top floor of which we were presently occupying.” Tenet himself later recalls that, in the minutes after he’d learned of the first attack, he’d “thought about the ‘Bojinka’ plot to blow up twelve US airliners over the Pacific and a subsequent plan to fly a small airplane into CIA headquarters” (see (8:55 a.m.-9:15 a.m.) September 11, 2001). 2002, PP. 7-8; TENET, 2007, PP. 162 AND 164 According to CIA contractor Billy Waugh, people at the headquarters are aware that Flight 93 is currently unaccounted for, and it is “a widespread assumption within the building that this flight is headed straight for us in the CIA headquarters” (see (Before 10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). AND KEOWN, 2004, PP. 293-294 Tenet asks Mike Hohlfelder, the chief of his security detail, for his recommendation, and is advised, “Let’s evacuate.” Though he later claims he was “reluctant” about this, Tenet tells his senior leadership: “We have to save our people. We have to evacuate the building.” Therefore, at about 10 a.m., the word goes out for a large number of the CIA’s thousands of employees to go home. Initially, the senior leadership team moves from Tenet’s seventh-floor conference room to another room on the first floor, but it then exits the headquarters building and heads across the campus to the CIA’s printing plant, where a crude operational capability has been set up. However, due to the objections of CIA counterterrorism chief Cofer Black, those in the Counterterrorist Center and the Global Response Center are allowed to stay in place in the headquarters (see (10:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Tenet and his staff will leave the printing plant and return to the headquarters at around 1 p.m., by which time they will consider the danger to be over. 2002, PP. 8-9; TENET, 2007, PP. 164-165 AND 168 The CIA headquarters evacuation is aided by the fact that a fire had occurred there just over a month earlier. Consequently, new evacuation procedures had been laid out, which Tenet follows on this day (see August 7-September 10, 2001). 2003, PP. 222-223 Entity Tags: George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency, Mike Hohlfelder, Billy Waugh Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93 (9:50 a.m.-9:51 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines Dispatcher Warns Flights to Land at Nearest Airport, Told Flight 93 Possibly Hijacked United Airlines dispatcher Ed Ballinger sends messages to the flights he is responsible for, telling them to land, and is also informed that Flight 93 is possibly hijacked. At 9:50, Ballinger sends a text message to Flight 93 and United’s other transcontinental flights, instructing them to “land ASP at nearest UAL airport—ORD terrorist.” (“ASP” is presumably short for “as soon as possible”; what “ORD” stands for is unreported.) The message also warns to beware of cockpit intrusion, stating, “No one in to cockpit—Land asp.” Over the next minute, Ballinger sends two more text messages to his flights, advising them to land as soon as possible. He still receives no response from Flight 93. United Airlines ordered that all its aircraft be grounded about five minutes earlier (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). COMMISSION, 1/27/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 44 However, Ballinger will later say that United dispatchers are told by their superiors, “Don’t tell the pilots why we want them to land.” DAILY HERALD, 4/14/2004 Also around this time, Rich Miles, the manager at United’s System Operations Control center, informs Ballinger about a call recently received by United’s maintenance facility in San Francisco, from an attendant on Flight 93, who reported that her plane had been hijacked (see 9:35 a.m. September 11, 2001). STREET JOURNAL, 10/15/2001; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 43 Entity Tags: Rich Miles, Ed Ballinger Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93 (9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Marine Fighter Squadron Offers Assistance to NEADS An F/A-18A Hornet belonging to Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 321. Robert Carlson / Naval Aviation News A US Marine with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 321 (VMFA-321) calls a friend of his at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) to ask what his unit can do to assist the military response to the attacks. 2008, PP. 188 Former Marine Heads to NEADS - Trey Murphy is a former Marine who now works as a weapons controller at NEADS. He learned of the first crash in New York while still at home. After seeing the second crash on television, he realized it was a coordinated attack and hurried to work. When he arrived on the NEADS operations floor at around 9:45, the head of the weapons team, Major James Fox, informed him that fighter jets were coming up from Selfridge and Toledo; both sets of jets had been told to contact NEADS and would require instructions. 2008, PP. 179-180 Marine Calls Murphy - After Murphy reportedly checks in the F-16 pilots from Selfridge Air National Guard Base and gives them orders (see (9:56 a.m.-10:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001), his cell phone rings. On the other end is a friend of his from VMFA-321, a Marine Corps Reserve squadron at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland that flies the sophisticated F/A-18 Hornet fighter jet. Murphy’s friend says: “Dude, get us in the war. I’ve got wrench-turners on our planes uploading weapons.” He then asks, “What can we do?” Normally, Murphy would not issue orders to the Marine squadron. As author Lynn Spencer will explain, VMFA-321 trains “to deploy overseas and they respond only to the US Joint Forces Command, commonly known as JiffyCom, and based in Norfolk, Virginia.” However, with the day’s unprecedented circumstances, Murphy instructs, “Convince your higher-ups at JiffyCom to get you transferred over to us!” Minutes later, Murphy is called by a general from VMFA-321. By this time, his attention is devoted to dealing with the possibly hijacked aircraft, Delta 1989. But before hanging up, he exclaims: “General! Can’t talk! But we could use your airplanes.” MILITARY (.COM), 6/2001; SPENCER, 2008, PP. 188 Entity Tags: Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 321, Northeast Air Defense Sector, Trey Murphy Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93 (9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Molten Metal Pours from South Tower Molten metal pouring out of the side of the World Trade Center. Cameraplanet Video footage later reveals that in the minutes immediately before the collapse of the WTC’s South Tower, a stream of molten metal starts pouring out of a window opening around the northeast corner of its 80th floor. FEMA later suggests that this is “possibly aluminum from the airliner,” and comments, “This is of particular interest because, although the building collapse appears to have initiated at this floor level, the initiation seems to have occurred at the southeast rather than the northeast corner.” ENGINEERING, 5/2002; FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, 5/1/2002, PP. 2-34; DWYER AND FLYNN, 2005, PP. 207 According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, “The composition of the flowing material can only be the subject of speculation, but its behavior suggests it could have been molten aluminum.” BUTLER, AND JUNKER, 9/2005, PP. 375 However physics professor Steven E. Jones will in 2006 dispute this, saying that molten aluminum is silvery and never turns yellow, like what is in the video footage. He will instead claim the presence of this molten metal supports the theory that explosives, specifically thermite, are what caused the Twin Towers to collapse. He says thermite can cause steel to melt and become yellowish. MORNING NEWS, 4/10/2006 Entity Tags: World Trade Center Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center (Between 9:50-10:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Numerous False Reports of Terrorist Acts in Washington A television broadcast falsely describes smoke coming from Washington Mall instead of its true source, the Pentagon. CNN There are numerous false reports of additional terror attacks. Before 10:00 a.m., some hear reports on television of a fire at the State Department. At 10:20 a.m., and apparently again at 10:33 a.m., it is publicly reported this was caused by a car bomb. CITIZEN, 9/11/2001; DAILY TELEGRAPH, 12/16/2001; BROADCASTING AND CABLE, 8/26/2002 At 10:23 a.m., the Associated Press reports, “A car bomb explodes outside the State Department, senior law enforcement officials say.” AND CABLE, 8/26/2002 Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke hears these reports at this time and asks Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in the State Department to see if the building he’s in has been hit. Armitage goes outside the building, finds out there’s no bomb, and calls his colleagues to inform them that the reports are false. Reports of a fire on the Capitol Mall also appear and are quickly found to be false. NEWS, 9/15/2002; CLARKE, 2004, PP. 8-9 There are numerous other false reports over the next hour, including explosions at the Capitol building and USA Today headquarters. AND CABLE, 8/26/2002 For instance, CNN reports an explosion on Capitol Hill at 10:12 a.m. CNN then announces this is untrue 12 minutes later. CITIZEN, 9/11/2001 Entity Tags: Richard Armitage, Richard A. Clarke, US Department of State Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Richard Clarke 9:51 a.m. September 11, 2001: Langley Jets Request and Receive Altitude Clearance over Washington Controllers at the FAA’s Washington Center. FAA The three F-16 fighter jets launched from Langley Air Force Base (see (9:25 a.m.-9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001) that have been directed toward Washington request and are given permission to fly at high altitude over the city. After the Langley AFB pilots are given the correct coordinates they are to head to (see (Between 9:41 a.m. and 9:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001), at 9:51 lead pilot Major Dean Eckmann looks on his radar screen and sees that the area where he has been directed to set up a combat air patrol is filled with air traffic. He therefore contacts the FAA’s Washington Center and tells the controller, “I need 3,000 feet of altitude in a 20-mile ring around DC.” When the controller asks the reason, Eckmann replies, “Higher headquarters’ request!” The controller gives him an altitude range of 25,000 to 27,000 feet. Eckmann radios the other two Langley pilots and gives them their altitude assignments: he’ll fly at 25,000 feet, Major Brad Derrig will be at 26,000 feet, and Captain Craig Borgstrom at 27,000 feet. According to author Lynn Spencer, the jets then head toward Washington at 700 miles per hour, just under the speed of sound. 2008, PP. 180-182 However, Spencer’s account of this incident conflicts with the 1st Air Force’s book about the 9/11 attacks. According to that account, several minutes before Eckmann reportedly asks for altitude clearance—at around 9:45 a.m.—he had been directed to drop to lower altitude to check out two unidentified aircraft, and was then told to inspect the Pentagon (see (9:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001). 2003, PP. 66 Entity Tags: Dean Eckmann, Craig Borgstrom, Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center, Brad Derrig Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93 9:52 a.m. September 11, 2001: Firefighters Reach 78th Floor of South Tower; Find Two Isolated Fires Ronald Bucca. Public domain Two firefighters climbing up the South Tower, Orio Palmer and Ronald Bucca, have reached its 78th floor, the lower end of the impact zone where Flight 175 hit. YORK TIMES, 8/4/2002 They are just two floors below the level where, minutes later, its collapse initiates. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, 5/1/2002, PP. 2-34 Over radio, Palmer tells firefighter Joseph Leavey, “We’ve got two isolated pockets of fire. We should be able to knock it down with two lines.” AND FLYNN, 2005, PP. 206 The fact that they reached so high up the tower only comes to light almost a year later, when a tape of radio communications from 9/11 is made public (see August 4, 2002). The New York Times will report “Nowhere on the tape is there any indication that firefighters had the slightest indication that the tower had become unstable or that it could fall.” YORK TIMES, 11/9/2002 Palmer’s communication appears to contradict claims that “extreme fires” contributed to the tower’s collapse. 9/13/2001; NEW YORK TIMES, 10/20/2004 Ronald Bucca, a Special Forces veteran, had actually conducted his own private research into Islamic militancy following the 1993 WTC bombing. He’d even taken time, in 1996, to attend the beginning of the trial of Ramzi Yousef, a mastermind of the bombing (see September 5, 1996). 2003, PP. 180-183, 333-334 Entity Tags: World Trade Center, Orio Palmer, Ronald Bucca Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, WTC Investigation, World Trade Center (9:52 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Lynne Cheney Joins Husband in White House Bunker Lynne Cheney conferring with Dick Cheney in the early afternoon on 9/11. David Bohrer/ White House According to the 9/11 Commission, the Secret Service logs Lynne Cheney’s arrival at the White House at 9:52 a.m. She joins her husband, Vice President Dick Cheney, in the tunnel leading to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) bunker below the White House, and then enters the PEOC alongside him. COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 40 She had been at her downtown office around the time the second tower was hit, at 9:03, when she was driven by the Secret Service to the White House. 12/31/2001 Yet, in a brief interview with an activist group in 2007, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta will claim that Lynne Cheney was already in the PEOC when he arrived there. (.ORG), 6/26/2007 According to Mineta’s recollections, this was at around 9:20-9:27 (see (Between 9:20 a.m. and 9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001). 9/11/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 5/23/2003 Lynne Cheney will sit in a corner of the PEOC, and write down notes on the various reports that are received this morning by the vice president. 9/11/2001; NEWSWEEK, 12/31/2001 Entity Tags: Norman Mineta, Secret Service, Lynne Cheney, Richard (“Dick”) Cheney Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Dick Cheney 9:53 a.m. September 11, 2001: NSA Intercepts Al-Qaeda Phone Call Predicting Fourth Attack The National Security Agency (NSA) reportedly intercepts a phone call from one of bin Laden’s operatives in Afghanistan to a phone number in the Republic of Georgia. The caller says he has “heard good news” and that another target is still to come (presumably, the target Flight 93 is intended to hit). NEWS, 9/4/2002 The caller is also supposed to say that the attackers are following through on “the doctor’s program.” This is said to be a reference to al-Qaeda’s number two leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has a doctorate in medicine. YORKER, 9/9/2002 Since the 9/11 crisis began, NSA translators have been told to focus on Middle Eastern intercepts and translate them as they are received instead of oldest first, as is the usual practice. This call is translated in the next hour or two, and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld hears about it just after noon. NEWS, 9/4/2002; BAMFORD, 2004, PP. 54 Entity Tags: Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda, National Security Agency, Donald Rumsfeld Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: Ayman Al-Zawahiri, All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Remote Surveillance 9:53 a.m. September 11, 2001: Hijackers Fear Passenger Retaliation According to Flight 93’s cockpit voice recording, the hijackers grow concerned that the passengers might retaliate. One urges that the plane’s fire axe be held up to the cockpit door’s peephole to scare the passengers. 2002, PP. 209-210 Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93 9:53 a.m. September 11, 2001: FAA Headquarters Still Only Talking About Telling NORAD of Flight 93 Hijack According to the 9/11 Commission, FAA headquarters informs the FAA Command Center that the deputy director for air traffic services is talking to Deputy Administrator Monte Belger about scrambling aircraft after Flight 93. Yet in interviews with the commission, neither Belger nor the deputy director recall this discussion, and Belger subsequently e-mails the commission saying he does not believe the conversation took place. However, tape recordings reveal a staff person from headquarters at this time telling the Command Center, “Peter’s talking to Monte now about scrambling.” FAA headquarters is also informed that the flight is 20 miles northwest of Johnstown, Pennsylvania. COMMISSION, 6/17/2004; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 461 When questioned about this, Belger will point out that there are military people on duty at the FAA Command Center and in a situation room at the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization, and that they are participating in what is going on. In addition, Belger will later tell the commission that he thought the NMCC was on the hijack net and would therefore have received notification on this channel at the same time as all other agencies. COMMISSION, 6/17/2004 Incredibly, FAA headquarters has known since 9:34 A.M. about hijackers talking about a bomb on board the flight, and more evidence has since been passed on confirming a hijacking in progress. Still, reportedly, no one tells NORAD anything about the plane. Entity Tags: Federal Aviation Administration, Monte Belger Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93 Before 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001: AWACS Planes on Training Missions in Florida and Near Washington, DC While President Bush is still in Sarasota, an AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System plane) is flying a training mission off the coast of Florida. Referring to the AWACS plane, NORAD Commander Larry Arnold later says: “I had set up an arrangement with their wing commander at Tinker Force Base, Oklahoma some months earlier for us to divert their AWACS off a normal training mission to go into an exercise scenario simulating an attack on the United States. The AWACS crew initially thought we were going into one of those simulations.” Another AWACS is also flying a training mission, near Washington, DC, the morning of 9/11. ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002 When its pilot, Anthony Kuczynski, hears of the first WTC crash, he mistakenly believes he is involved in a planned military simulation. He says, “We sometimes do scenarios where we’re protecting the United States from bombers coming in from unknown areas.” THOMAS AQUIN, 4/12/2002 Entity Tags: Larry Arnold, Anthony Kuczynski Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Training Exercises Before 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001: AWACS Plane on Training Mission Instructed to Follow Air Force One Ben Robinson. US Air Force An Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) plane is directed toward Sarasota, Florida, where President Bush is currently located, and will accompany Air Force One as it carries Bush back to Washington, DC. The AWACS has been flying a training mission off the east coast of Florida (see Before 9:55 a.m. September 11, 2001). NORAD now instructs it to head toward Sarasota, on Florida’s west coast. Pilot Thinks This Is an Exercise - Several months previously, Major General Larry Arnold, the commanding general of NORAD’s Continental US Region, made arrangements with Brigadier General Ben Robinson, the commander of the 552nd Air Control Wing at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, for AWACS support to be provided during training exercises simulating attacks on the United States. As Arnold will later recall, the pilot of the AWACS that NORAD now contacts “thought it was an exercise.” However the pilot is then told “what happened at the World Trade Center” and realizes “his responsibility was to follow the president.” Arnold will say: “We told him to follow Air Force One, and he asked the question we all asked: ‘Where is it going?’ We said: ‘We can’t tell you. Just follow it.’” 2002; CODE ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002; FILSON, 2003, PP. 86-87 AWACS Escorts President to Washington - The time the AWACS plane gets close enough to Air Force One to be of assistance to it is unclear. According to journalist and author Bill Sammon, by around 10:30 a.m., it has not yet arrived to protect the president’s plane. 2002, PP. 107 Arnold will recall that NORAD maintains “the AWACS overhead the whole route,” as Air Force One flies to Barksdale Air Force Base, then Offutt Air Force Base, and then back to Washington. ONE MAGAZINE, 1/2002 AWACS Is a 'Wonderful Asset' - According to Mark Rosenker, the director of the White House Military Office, AWACS planes “give you the big picture in the sky. They’re able to identify what’s a friend, what’s a foe.” Rosenker, who will fly with Bush on Air Force One after it takes off from Sarasota (see (9:56 a.m.) September 11, 2001), says the AWACS is “a wonderful asset to have up there for us, it tremendously helped us to be able to guide for where we needed to go, to what potential problems we might encounter.… It was an important part of what we needed to do to guarantee the safety of the president of the United States.” HOUSE, 8/29/2002 Entity Tags: North American Aerospace Defense Command, Larry Arnold, Mark Rosenker, 552nd Air Control Wing Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, George Bush (9:54 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Passenger Elizabeth Wainio Calls Stepmother from Flight 93 Elizabeth Wainio. Family photo Honor Elizabeth Wainio, a 27-year-old passenger on board Flight 93, calls her stepmother Esther Heymann, who is in Cantonsville, Maryland. TRIBUNE, 9/30/2001; PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001 According to journalist and author Jere Longman, the call starts “shortly past nine-fifty.” Official accounts say it starts at 9:54, or seconds before. 2002, PP. 167; 9/11 COMMISSION, 8/26/2004, PP. 44 ; US DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 Wainio begins, “We’re being hijacked. I’m calling to say good-bye.” She says a “really nice person” next to her has handed her the phone and told her to call her family. News reports suggest this person is Lauren Grandcolas, who had been assigned a seat by Wainio in row 11 of the plane. POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001; LONGMAN, 2002, PP. 167-168; MSNBC, 9/3/2002; MSNBC, 9/11/2006 But according to a summary of passenger phone calls presented at the 2006 Zacarias Moussaoui trial, Wainio and Grandcolas are now separated and sitting in different areas of the plane. Wainio is now in row 33 along with fellow passenger Marion Britton and an unnamed flight attendant. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, ALEXANDRIA DIVISION, 7/31/2006 According to some reports, Wainio is using a cell phone. Newsweek states that she actually tells her stepmother she is using a cell phone loaned to her by another passenger. 9/22/2001; CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 9/30/2001 But the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette claims she uses an Airfone. POST-GAZETTE, 10/28/2001 According to Longman, there are “long silences” throughout the call. 7/30/2002 Heymann cannot hear anyone in the background: “She could not hear any conversation or crying or yelling or whimpering. Nothing.” 2002, PP. 172 Longman describes that Heymann gets the feeling her stepdaughter is “resigned to what was going to happen to her. And that she actually seemed to be leaving her body, going to a better place. She had had two grandmothers who were deceased, and at one point she told her stepmother, ‘They’re waiting for me.’” 7/30/2002 Wainio also talks about her family, and says she is worried about how her brother and sister will handle this terrible news. 2002, PP. 168 Accounts conflict over how long her call lasts and when it ends (see (Between 9:58 a.m. and 10:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Entity Tags: Jere Longman, Lauren Grandcolas, Esther Heymann, Elizabeth Wainio Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls 9:54 a.m. September 11, 2001: Flight 93 Passenger Tom Burnett Calls for Fourth Time; Details Plan to Take Control of Plane Passenger Tom Burnett makes his fourth and final call from Flight 93 to his wife Deena Burnett. Deena makes a note of the time of the call. 2002, PP. 118 Tom asks her, “Anything new?” and then, “Where are the kids?” When Deena says their three young daughters are asking to talk to him, Tom says, “Tell them I’ll talk to them later.” After a pause, he explains that he and some of the other passengers are going to try and seize control of the plane from the hijackers: “We’re waiting until we’re over a rural area. We’re going to take back the airplane.” He adds: “If they’re going to crash this plane into the ground, we’re going to have to do something.… We can’t wait for the authorities. I don’t know what they could do anyway. It’s up to us. I think we can do it.” He remains calm throughout the conversation. He tells Deena to just pray. BEE, 9/11/2002; BURNETT AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 66-67 According to notes of Deena Burnett’s initial interview with the FBI (see (12:30 p.m.) September 11, 2001), Tom tells Deena he may not speak to her again. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 9/11/2001 But in her 2006 book, Deena Burnett will describe Tom saying: “Don’t worry. I’ll be home for dinner. I may be late, but I’ll be home.” Finally he says, “We’re going to do something,” and then hangs up. The call lasts less than two minutes. AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 67 Tom does not give any personal message to his wife during the call. 9/12/2001 Deena will later reflect: “He honestly expected to be home later that morning. If he thought he was going to die on that plane, he would have called his parents and sisters and talked to his daughters. At the very least, he would have given me a message for them. But he didn’t ask to speak to any of them. He was fighting to live.” AND GIOMBETTI, 2006, PP. 68 Entity Tags: Tom Burnett, Deena Burnett Timeline Tags: 9/11 Timeline Category Tags: All Day of 9/11 Events, Flight UA 93, Alleged Passenger Phone Calls